In the boldest move yet against the life settlement industry, the ACLI released a policy statement in which it announced its desire to end the securitization of life settlements. The ACLI says the move is aimed at protecting seniors from solicitation, as well as preventing stranger-originated life insurance, or STOLI, the growth of which is undoubtedly fueled by investors' desire to find profitable and "uncorrelated" investments.
Where companies bundle life settlements together and sell beneficial interests as securities, it is difficult for those investors to know whether the bundle will include STOLI transactions or not. At least until the 2008 liquidity crisis, the demand for life settlement-based securities appeared to be high. That demand, in turn, created a risk that the policies themselves would be created for the purpose of selling them - if not immediately, then immediately upon the end of the two year contestibility period.
The inability to securitize life settlements may slow the momentum of the industry, and help protect seniors from solicitation from secondary market brokers, so that life settlements can again be considered as discreet estate planning events for appropriate individuals, rather than in reaction to overly aggressive sales tactics.
The story of another secondary insurance market may have some relevance to the issue of life settlements securitizations. In the late 1990s, a secondary market for structured settlement payment rights led to securitized sales of bundles pools of payment rights, notwithstanding the questionable legality of the underlying sales of the payment rights. Private placement memoranda at the time glossed over the insurers' ability to invalidate the sales by way of anti-assignment provisions or based on other legal grounds, and purchasers reassured investors that the payments could be collected by way of lawsuits, agreed judgments, and garnishments. Eventually, the secondary market companies took the position that the very securitization of the payments made the transactions valid, and the insurers' challenges to the enforceability of the underlying sales had the potential to "pull the rug" out from the secondary market company as well as the "bona fide" investors. In time, federal and state legislation regulating the industry was aimed at addressing the concerns of the primary structured settlement industry, as well as others with interests at stake.
As to life settlements, life insurance companies may be motivated by concerns their representatives have described concerning the possibility that the growth of the life settlement industry is threatening the favorable tax treatment of life insurance, as well as the marketability of the sale of life insurance.
Legislation proscribing or severely limiting the securitization of life settlements likely would please many regulators, Many would also view such restrictions as consistent with protection of insurance companies against the risk of fraud, as well as against the burden of trying to detect fraudulent transactions within the contestibility period.